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Decisional Sequencing: Limitations from Jurisdictional
Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion
Kevin M. Clermont*

This Article treats the order of decision on multiple issues in a single case. That order can
be very important, with a lot at stake for the court, society, and parties. Generally speaking, by
weighing those various interests, the judge gets to choose the decisional sequence, although the
parties can control which issues they put before the judge.
The law sees fit to put few limits on the judge’s power, and properly so. The few limits
are in fact quite narrow in application, and even narrower if properly understood. The Steel Co.Ruhrgas rule generally requires a federal court to decide Article III justiciability and subjectmatter jurisdiction before ruling on the merits. The Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen rule requires a
federal trial judge to avoid preclusion by giving first to the jury a factual issue common to the
merits of both law and equity claims for relief joined in the same case.

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 2
I. DECISIONAL SEQUENCING ............................................................................................... 2
A. Discretion .......................................................................................................... 3
B. Rules .................................................................................................................. 5
C. Fog .................................................................................................................... 7
II. JURISDICTIONAL PRIMACY ............................................................................................. 7
A. Nonbypassability, or Deciding First Things First............................................. 8
1. Rule....................................................................................................... 8
2. Exception .............................................................................................. 9
3. Nonbypassable Grounds ..................................................................... 10
B. Resequencing, or Using Hypothetical Jurisdiction to Produce a “Valid”
Invalid Judgment..................................................................................... 14
1. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction ................................................ 15
2. Jurisdiction to Determine No Jurisdiction .......................................... 17
3. Hypothetical Subject-Matter Jurisdiction ........................................... 19
4. Resequenceable Grounds.................................................................... 23
5. Discretion to Resequence.................................................................... 29
C. Summary.......................................................................................................... 29
III. INTRASUIT PRECLUSION .............................................................................................. 30
A. Jury-Judge Sequencing.................................................................................... 30
1. Cases ................................................................................................... 30
2. Consequences...................................................................................... 34
B. Foreclosure ..................................................................................................... 36
1. Res Judicata ........................................................................................ 37
2. Law of the Case .................................................................................. 39
C. Summary.......................................................................................................... 41
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 42

*

Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University. I want to thank Gerard McCarthy ’11 for
research help and Mike Dorf, Scott Idleman, Bo Rutledge, and Emily Sherwin for valuable
comments.

2

INTRODUCTION
“The evidence and arguments a district court considers in the class
certification decision call for rigorous analysis,” warned the appellate court in the
celebrated class action called In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation.1 For
certification, the court explained, the class representative must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the case satisfies the requirements for class
treatment. “An overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of
a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to
determine whether a class certification requirement is met.”2
In other words, after electing to pose a threshold question, the legal system
advises the trial court just to plow ahead, even though the judge will encounter an
issue that may arise for decision on the merits at trial in the same formulation and
under the same standard of proof. To alleviate any discomfort generated by such a
view, the Third Circuit resorted to unsupported pronouncement perhaps without
the requisite “rigorous analysis,” mustering this dictum: “Although the district
court’s findings for the purpose of class certification are conclusive on that topic,
they do not bind the fact-finder on the merits.”3 Where did the court get that idea?
When is a judge really free to decide the order of decision, even without worry of
untoward preclusion?
I. DECISIONAL SEQUENCING
Before deciding a case and uttering the necessary legal pronouncements,
the court must confront a series of issues, a series that may be sequenced in any of
numerous ways. Deciding the order of decision is among the law’s most basic
decisions. Who decides the order of decision? Although parties generally control
the issues put before the judge, the judge generally decides the sequence of
decision.4
1

552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008) (involving antitrust conspiracy action by purchasers of
hydrogen peroxide and related chemical products against chemical manufacturers); see Linda S.
Mullenix, Class Certification, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 9, 9 (describing Hydrogen Peroxide as
potentially “the most influential decision relating to class certification” of the decade).
2
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008). The quoted
views conform to today’s usual approach. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. It is the ever
more important approach as more courts are getting into the merits to screen out class actions at
the certification stage. See Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward
Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935
(2009).
3
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008).
4
See
Peter
B.
Rutledge,
Decisional
Sequencing,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572709 (Mar. 1, 2010) (providing the only general treatment of
sequencing and the interests at stake in an excellent article, which considers only the alternative-
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Of course, I am talking here of formal legal reasoning, not intuitive
decisionmaking. One significant setting in legal reasoning for exploring the
sequencing decision is where the court faces alternative grounds for disposition,
that is, an array of open routes to disposing of the claim, one way or the other.
The best specific example is where a defendant has raised a number of defenses,
so that the court might decide for the defendant because of lack of jurisdiction or
improper venue or the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim or the defendant’s
affirmative defense. The sequence obviously matters, because the consequence is
that the court reaches some issues and does not reach other issues. Among much
else, the amount of effort by the court, the kind of law made, and the parties’
discovery needs all turn on the sequence of decision. The law could impose a
sequencing rule, dictating the order in which the court must decide the defenses.
Or the law could leave it up to the judge’s discretion.
This example of alternative grounds of dismissal gives a useful sense of
what a sequencing rule is: a binding direction that the court face this issue before
that issue. My interest is more general than that example, however. The order in
which the court confronts nondispositive issues also matters. It affects the course
of a case’s progress. Parties care about it mostly because an early victory on some
issue, or even the threatened intrusiveness of early attention to certain issues, can
shift their settlement leverage dramatically. Moreover, what is at stake for them
will increase to the extent that foreclosure of a decided issue is possible later in
the case. That latter concern prompted the dictum in the Hydrogen Peroxide case,
whereby the appellate court assured readers that the judge’s class certification
decision would not bind a jury on common issues intertwined in the merits.
Therefore, because the decisional sequence can always have effects, the law could
conceivably dictate sequencing in any setting.
A. Discretion
It turns out that the judges have a lot of freedom to sequence issues as the
judges wish. In the wide realm of freedom that judges enjoy in deciding the order
of decision, what factors guide them? Three general categories of factors
predominate, as suggested by the pioneering work of Professor Rutledge.5
First, and obviously, judicial economy plays a major role. The court’s
being free to pick and choose which issue to address first will affect the total
amount of effort required. Most notably, among alternative grounds for
disposition, proceeding immediately to the easiest and surest ground that ends the
grounds-of-dismissal scenario but widens the focus to explore that sequencing problem as it exists
between trial and appellate courts and between courts in different jurisdictions).
5
See id. at 19-27.
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case would tend to lessen judicial workload. The court could thereby avoid shaky
decisions of difficult issues. Ease of disposition reflects a variety of factors that go
beyond a limited need for research and deliberation, such as the ease of
considering objective matters rather than subjective matters. Sureness of
disposition pays the various premiums of clarity of outcome in the trial court, as
well as minimization of costs on appeal.
In the sequencing of nondispositive issues, choosing a certain path also
might decrease judicial effort. Awareness that most cases end in settlement might
counsel a particular sequence of least effort. Even legal logic (such as liability
should come before remedy, or elements of the claim come before affirmative
defenses) or pure logic (deductive logic prompts a certain order, or reflective
equilibrium imposes an iteration) might suggest a path of decision that reduces
mental effort.
Additionally, there is often a practicality in following a certain order
(preliminary relief comes before final relief, or factual issues need to be tried
toward the end), but these are not strictly binding rules of sequencing. More
toward the substantive side of things, the law might provide an “if-then”
relationship that appears to dictate a sequence. That is, although not as commonly
as one would suppose, the law might say that some issue needs to be decided a
certain way before a desirable procedure or remedy can be followed or pursued.
The best example is the rule that the plaintiff must show an inadequate remedy at
law in order to make an equitable remedy available.6 But really these propositions
too are matters of practicality rather than mandated sequencing. The proof lies in
thinking of these propositions in the alternative-grounds-of-dismissal scenario: the
court can then sequence as it wishes, so that the court could first decide that no
equitable remedy exists and hence avoid deciding inadequacy of the legal remedy.
Even when applying these propositions to nondispositive issues, the court could
actually decide in any order it wishes, even though it usually is more economic to
decide the “if” before the “then.”
Second, other institutional factors may suggest a certain sequence. A trial
judge may very well choose to foster institutional interests by adopting a certain
sequence; for example, the judge might take into account that the sequence will
affect the output of precedent and thus the development of the law. There are also
prudential doctrines, like the passive virtue of avoiding constitutional issues,7 or
6

See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 22, 43 (2d
ed. 1948).
7
See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV.
847 (2005) (lamenting the many exceptions to that presumption). Compare Alexander M. Bickel,
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961),
with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
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considerations of judicial restraint and federalism that counsel avoiding certain
issues when possible. These factors too are not strictly binding rules of
sequencing even if hierarchically announced, but instead they act as a way of
informing the trial courts’ discretion by identifying particularly weighty factors.
Moreover, there are certain issues marked as threshold issues, like class
certification,8 that require early attention as a gatekeeping mechanism. But these
are more timing guidelines than sequencing rules.
Third, the sequence can affect the substantive goals of law. It surely
impacts the parties’ interests. It affects the parties’ litigation behavior, such as in
choosing which issues to raise in the hope of constraining the judge’s sequencing.
Even more clearly, it affects their settlement leverage; for example, the court’s
ability to skip over some jurisdictional issues and allow the plaintiff to pursue
discovery and decision on the merits will often work to the disadvantage of
defendants.9 A trial judge may take the goals of law into account in setting a
sequence, although presumably maintenance of neutrality between the parties
should be the judge’s strongest motive here.
Even with so much at stake in the sequencing decision, lawmakers choose
usually not to impose mandatory sequencing rules on judges. This Article will try
to delineate the wide extent of the judges’ freedom to sequence.
B. Rules
The suggestive discussion above of the factors relevant to sequencing
shows the picture to be so complicated that, presumptively, lawmakers should
stay out and just leave it up to the judges’ discretion. However, given the
reasonable assumption that judges tend to act in self-interest, judges may too
heavily weigh the first factor of minimizing workload.10 Thus, lawmakers may
8

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is
sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a
class action.”); 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785.3, at 453 (3d ed. 2005) (“The time at which the court finds it
appropriate to make its class-action determination may vary with the circumstances of the
particular case.”).
9
See Rutledge, supra note 4, at 27:
Flexible sequencing rules strengthen a defendant’s position in settlement because the
defendant has more avenues available to it for immediate dismissal with a lower risk of
an adverse ruling. By contrast, rigid sequencing rules strengthen a plaintiff’s position in
settlement because the mandatory sequence enables the plaintiff to obtain a favorable
ruling on an early issue and, depending on the availability of jurisdictional discovery,
drive up the defendant’s costs early in the dispute.
10
See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (arguing that judicial response to various legal rules is
often the result of judges’ self-interest); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39 (1993) (stating
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need to regulate in order to protect the other public and private interests at stake,
at least when their neglect would come at an especially high cost. But still,
intervention should be the exception.
Conforming to that conservative view on the normative question, the
descriptive fact is that, on the civil side, there are remarkably few external
limitations on the trial judges’ freedom to sequence. The legislative branch has
been wholly inactive. Perhaps interest groups have formulated insufficient
concern over the subtleties of sequencing and so exerted no pressure. The
judiciary has intervened seldom. Perhaps institutional worries are usually too
small to generate higher courts’ concern over trial judges’ sequencing
performance.
In current law I see only two sequencing rules of significance, given the
above-described narrow definition of what constitutes such a rule. They both
derive from judicial interpretations of the Constitution, and they are very heavily
dependent on concerns linked to federal courts. Interestingly, they both embroil
the commentator quickly and thoroughly in matters of res judicata—without
careful attention to preclusion these two sequencing rules will ever remain
mysterious. The first of the rules arises from the scenario of alternative grounds
for disposition that the defendant chose to put before the court, while the second
involves the more general scenario of multiple issues.
The major limitation extant is that of the Steel Co.11 and Ruhrgas12 line,
which says that a federal court must decide a challenge to its jurisdiction over the
case before dismissing on the merits. As this Article will explain, this rule boils
down to a fairly modest constraint: one big exception is that the court still may
pick among jurisdictional and other threshold defenses, with a dismissal on any
one enjoying some preclusive effect.13
Another rule, deriving from the Beacon Theatres14 and Dairy Queen15
cases, dictates that when a common factual issue is to come before both judge and
jury, the jury must decide it first to avoid the preclusive effect of a judicial
decision subverting the constitutional jury right in federal court. As this Article
will also explain, this rule is very narrow too: it applies only to trial of factual

as plausible that “judicial effort has a diminishing effect on the satisfactions from judicial
voting”).
11
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
12
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
13
See infra Part II.
14
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
15
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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issues common to the merits of both law and equity claims for relief joined in the
same case.16
C. Fog
Although lawmakers impose little constraint on the judges’ freedom to
sequence, the prevailing lack of clarity about the existence and scope of the
sequencing rules works to constrain judges more broadly. The court might be very
unsure of when it can skip over jurisdiction. Or it may worry that an early
decision will bind its subsequent decision of overlapping matters. Consider, for
example, this district court’s concerned musings about deciding a typical issue of
personal jurisdiction that involved issues in common with the merits:
If the [threshold-decision] course were undertaken, the court might be
deciding key fact issues that, if the doctrine of estoppel were not applied,
would be resubmitted for jury determination at trial, thus making wasteful
use of scarce judicial resources and also creating a possibility of
inconsistent findings by the court on motion and the jury at trial. If
estoppel were applied on the basis of the court’s resolution of the issues,
thereby precluding waste and inconsistency, then either the court must
impanel a jury just to try those issues for disposition of the motion—a
dubious procedure at best—or else the parties would effectively be denied
jury trial on those issues because the court’s findings on them when
determining the motion would preclude their resubmission at jury trial.17
To the extent that such confusion creates a broader constraint than the
lawmaker intended, the constraint is undesirable. Hence, bringing clarity should
be beneficial. Clarification of the rules of sequencing, then, is another aim of this
Article.
II. JURISDICTIONAL PRIMACY
Our law’s foremost sequencing rule says that a federal court’s decision on
a challenge to its jurisdiction must come before decision on the merits.18 To
understand that rule, which as already mentioned stems from the Steel Co.19 and
16

See infra Part III.
North Am. Video Corp. v. Leon, 480 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Mass. 1979); see Kevin M.
Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 978-1000 (2006) (calming this particular
worry by establishing that the standard of proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the
standard applicable to the merits).
18
See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER &
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1411-17 (6th ed. 2009).
19
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998).
17
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Ruhrgas20 cases, one must first draw the subtle distinction between
“nonbypassability” and “resequencing.”21
Nonbypassability, or the requirement to decide first things first, rests
mainly on the Steel Co. case. A court cannot skip over a challenge to subjectmatter jurisdiction in order to dismiss on the merits, even though finding a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction would likewise have produced a victory for the
defendant. So, when I say a defense is “nonbypassable,” I mean that a court
cannot skip over it and instead dismiss on the merits. The sequencing rule is
subject-matter jurisdiction first.
Resequencing, which received its blessing in Ruhrgas, avoids this
sequencing rule. It allows courts to avoid decision on subject-matter jurisdiction
by hypothesizing its existence in order to dismiss on other threshold grounds with
a binding effect. A court can skip over challenged subject-matter jurisdiction to
dismiss, say, for lack of personal jurisdiction. So, when I say a defense is
“resequenceable,” I mean that a court can choose to dismiss on it without first
facing a nonbypassable defense like subject-matter jurisdiction.
A. Nonbypassability, or Deciding First Things First
Nonbypassability has obvious sequencing implications for judicial
decisionmaking. Courts must decide in a certain order if a nonbypassability rule is
in place. To the extent that courts are uncertain about the reach of that rule, but
wish to avoid reversal, they will follow it even when it does not apply. Thus,
some attention to the rule’s precise meaning is in order.
1.

Rule

Drawing on a line of precedent stretching way back,22 Steel Co. held that
the lower federal court could not dismiss for failure to state a claim without first
deciding a challenge to Article III standing23 (which, according to the Court, was
lacking in the case but posed a harder question to resolve).24 Even though the
result was the same—judgment for defendant—the federal court could not give a
judgment on the merits without first ascertaining it had jurisdiction.

20

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999).
See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 92-94 (2001) (providing the best treatment of this doctrine).
22
See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804) (allowing the plaintiff to
raise original subject-matter jurisdiction on appeal).
23
See generally 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 9-16, §§ 3531.4-3531.6 (3d ed. 2008).
24
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998).
21
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The Court rested its decision on separation of powers and the requirement
of a case or controversy. In order for courts to stay within their proper limits, they
cannot go about rendering a decision on the merits without making sure that the
case fell within the courts’ jurisdictional bounds. Based on its reasoning and
wording, by “jurisdiction” the Court meant Article III justiciability25 as well as
more ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction.26 The Court itself has never added
anything to that short list of nonbypassable defenses.
2.

Exception

Steel Co. represented the high water mark for the nonbypassability
doctrine. The Court’s opinion itself was far from definitive on whether
jurisdiction must come before everything else. The majority itself admitted that
precedent had “diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is
always an antecedent question.”27 And the separate opinions of six of the Justices
went further in underlining that qualification.28
The Court’s subsequent cases have indeed cut back on Steel Co.’s seeming
thrust by drawing a line between nonmerits and merits and by then ruling that a
federal court can dismiss on nonmerits grounds without reaching Article III
justiciability or subject-matter jurisdiction.29 The fountainhead case of Ruhrgas,
in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg one year after Steel Co., held that a
court may resequence nonmerits defenses in a way such that the court faces a

25

See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER &
RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 (3d ed. 2008).
26
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998) (referring to the
“statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction,” the Court ruled: “For a court to
pronounce upon the [merits] when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court
to act ultra vires.”).
27
Id. at 101; see infra note 98 (collecting cases).
28
Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 265-66
(2000) (footnotes omitted), described the concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor, the opinion of
Justice Breyer concurring in part and in the judgment, and the opinions of Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg concurring in the judgment:
To summarize the positions of the various Justices: Justices Rehnquist and
Thomas join the more traditional view espoused by Justice Scalia and denounce
“hypothetical jurisdiction” but do not completely shut the door . . . . Justice Breyer
clearly approves of “hypothetical jurisdiction” in some circumstances and both Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy leave open the question of if and when “hypothetical
jurisdiction” should be permitted, but indicate that the doctrine has some validity. Justice
Stevens, with whom Justice Souter concurred, at the very least leaves open the question
of “hypothetical jurisdiction” or approves of it, depending upon which portion of the
opinion one relies upon. Only Justice Ginsburg refused to be drawn into the discussion,
and it was she who wrote the unanimous opinion in Ruhrgas.
29
See infra note 100 (collecting cases).
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personal jurisdiction defense before deciding a subject-matter jurisdiction
defense.30
As discussed below,31 one might argue that the list of nonmerits defenses
eligible for resequencing remains especially unclear. Nevertheless, it is absolutely
clear that this list of resequenceable threshold matters is not the same as, and is in
fact much longer than, the list of fundamental matters that a federal court cannot
bypass in favor of the merits. The Steel Co. case used the example of statutory
standing32 as a resequenceable defense that could precede subject-matter
jurisdiction, as well as a defense that the court could bypass in order to dismiss on
the merits.33 But that is just one example. A court can also bypass prudential
standing34 and a host of other resequenceable threshold issues.35
3.

Nonbypassable Grounds

So, more precisely, which defenses can a court not bypass in order to get
to the merits? To appear on the list of nonbypassable defenses, a ground must
involve a pretty basic matter in the nature of subject-matter jurisdiction. As the
D.C. Circuit put it, “ ‘a less than pure jurisdictional question, need not be decided
before a merits question.’ ”36
To repeat, most entries on the longer list of resequenceable threshold
matters are bypassable. The prime, and largely determinative, question in relating
the two lists is whether a court can bypass the resequenceable defense of personal
jurisdiction.37 So, can a court pass over personal jurisdiction in order to dismiss
on the merits?

30

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999) (treating personal
jurisdiction as resequenceable).
31
See infra text accompanying notes 96-126.
32
See generally 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.13 (3d ed. 2008).
33
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998) (detailing
expressly that a court can bypass a statutory standing question and go to the merits, but a court can
resequence that question before an Article III justiciability or subject-matter jurisdiction defense).
34
See generally 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3531, at 9-16.
35
See Idleman, supra note 21, at 93, 95-97. Compare In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192
F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding a court can bypass federal sovereign
immunity for the merits), with Galvan v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (holding a court can resequence federal sovereign immunity).
36
In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(quoting United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)).
37
See Idleman, supra note 21, at 95.
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Although the cases before Steel Co. were split on this question,38 since
then they are perhaps leaning more toward no.39 Most disturbingly, the Supreme
Court seems to have assumed no. In its latest case in this line, Sinochem, the
Court implied that personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction are
equivalents for the purpose of the nonbypassability doctrine.40 In that case, the
district court had held that it possessed admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction, but
declined to decide personal jurisdiction and instead dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds. The court of appeals agreed on subject-matter jurisdiction,
but held that the court could not skip over personal jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court reversed, allowing dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds without
decision on personal jurisdiction. The course of decision had removed from the
Court’s holding anything regarding bypassability of personal jurisdiction: its
holding is perfectly consistent with a view that either forum non conveniens or the
merits can precede personal jurisdiction. Also, because the lower courts had
decided that subject-matter jurisdiction existed, the Court clarified little about
resequenceability: its stated view that forum non conveniens is resequenceable
before subject-matter jurisdiction is dictum. Indeed, the Court, in another
unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg, taught little besides the fact that this
doctrine has become too complicated for the Court itself. It most pointedly proved
this by declaring that Steel Co., which in fact did not involve or discuss personal
jurisdiction, “clarified that a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of
a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim
in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction).”41 That
erroneous dictum will surely influence the lower courts in the future.42
I nevertheless think yes, a court can pass over personal jurisdiction in
order to dismiss on the merits—in other words, personal jurisdiction is a
resequenceable but bypassable defense. One reason is that Steel Co.’s concerns of
separation of powers and the requirement of a case or controversy do not extend
38

See id. at 95 nn.524-25.
Compare United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir. 1999), and
Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 623 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999), with Pace v. Bureau
of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 1998) (per curiam), and
United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 80 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (bypassing service of process for
the merits).
40
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007); see Nathan
Viavant, Recent Development, Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping
Corp.: The United States Supreme Court Puts Forum Non Conveniens First, 16 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 557, 571-72 (2008) (viewing Sinochem to be so unclear as to sow the seeds for the
demise of the nonbypassability rule).
41
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007).
42
See Dan v. Douglas County Dep’t of Corrections, No. 8:06CV714, 2009 WL 483837, at
*3 (D. Neb. Feb. 25, 2009); Ashton v. Florala Memorial Hosp., No. CIV.A. 206CV226-ID, 2007
WL 1526837, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Ala. May 24, 2007). But see Di Loreto v. Costigan, 351 F. App’x
747 (3d Cir. 2009) (bypassing personal jurisdiction for the merits).
39
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to personal jurisdiction. Likewise, any concern of intruding on the states’
authority does not extend beyond subject-matter jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit
again provided a good explanation: “The district court was not required to resolve
the issue of personal jurisdiction prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim because personal jurisdiction exists to protect the liberty
interests of defendants, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which serves as a
limitation on judicial competence.”43
Moreover, the defendant, like the system, has no real grounds for
complaining about the initial court bypassing personal jurisdiction. A victory on
the merits, with its broad res judicata effects, is worth more to the defendant than
a jurisdictional dismissal. The defendant has put multiple defenses before the
court, and so has consented somewhat to any sort of sequencing.
However, the key difference between Article III justiciability and subjectmatter jurisdiction, on the one hand, and personal jurisdiction, on the other hand,
is that a judgment that skips over the former might be a valid judgment under the
doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction as elaborated in the famed Chicot
case.44 This doctrine means that a judgment that has intruded on other branches or
imperiled federalism can nonetheless stand safe from challenge. Notwithstanding
all the slogans about subject-matter jurisdiction’s fundamental importance, the
offense to the systemic interests at stake is not great enough always to warrant
relief from judgment—unlike the more individual interests wrapped up in the
often constitutionally based intricacies of personal jurisdiction. A defendant who
has not waived an undecided personal jurisdiction defense should be able to raise
it to obtain relief from judgment.45 After a court bypassed personal jurisdiction
and dismissed the case on other grounds, the defendant could get relief from the
judgment if the defendant, who is the only concerned party, were ever to need
such relief.
Therein lies the key to understanding nonbypassability. The list of
nonbypassable items should not turn solely on the relative importance of defenses,
which would open fruitless debate on the stature of subject-matter jurisdiction
43

Pace v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 17,
1998) (per curiam) (distinguishing Steel Co.).
44
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940) (precluding a
defaulted defendant from collateral attack on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, after other
defendants had appeared and litigated the case without raising subject-matter jurisdiction and after
the prior court had canceled the defendants’ bonds); see infra text accompanying notes 55-62. A
related assumed-jurisdiction mechanism, for foreclosing attack on challenged but skipped subjectmatter jurisdiction, entails the extension of hypothetical jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying
notes 81-95.
45
See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.4(C) (2d ed. 2009)
(explaining that waiver equates to jurisdiction by consent, but that a defaulting defendant can later
challenge territorial jurisdiction or notice).
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versus that of personal jurisdiction.46 The actual concern instead derives from the
asymmetry between subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction under
preclusion doctrine: unlitigated subject-matter jurisdiction can preclude. The fear
is that a court will bypass some such prerequisite for adjudicating and then give a
dismissal on the merits that is later unassailable. To avoid that result, the Court
declares the preclusive prerequisite to be nonbypassable.
Now, it appears that when the law says a defense is “nonbypassable,” it
means that if a court nevertheless purposefully skips the defense in order to give
dismissal on the merits, no brand of assumed jurisdiction will protect the
judgment from attack. When the law says that a court “cannot” bypass subjectmatter jurisdiction, it means that if the court violates the rule, a person can get
relief from the judgment upon showing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
whether or not that person appealed the judgment. But that person cannot attack
the judgment simply for violation of the nonbypassability rule, because that would
be mere error and not a void judgment.47
Thus, the list of nonbypassable items should include only those
requirements for a valid judgment that, if skipped over by the court, could
otherwise be cut off as a ground for attack. Accordingly, that list of
nonbypassable prerequisites should include subject-matter jurisdiction, but not
territorial jurisdiction or notice. The authorities are lax in defining the precise
scope of “subject-matter jurisdiction” as a requirement for validity.48 A lack of
jurisdiction under Article III will result in relief from judgment.49 But the lesser
aspects of justiciability will not.50 And courts need to keep jurisdiction and the

46

But see Idleman, supra note 21, at 31-39.
See CLERMONT, supra note 45, § 5.1(B)(1) (explaining the concept of validity).
48
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (1982) (defining subject-matter
jurisdiction as the court’s “authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action”
and acknowledging that the authority may derive from constitutional or statutory provisions);
Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J.
164, 164 n.1 (1977).
49
See, e.g., Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 939, 954-55
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (“Because there was no case or controversy, this court lacked constitutional
power to enter judgment against defendants.”), rev’d on other grounds, 402 F.3d 1198 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
50
See, e.g., Mendell v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731-32 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Plaintiff’s
acquisition of a note following an adverse ruling on his claim to standing as a shareholder did not
present the kind of “extraordinary” circumstance that mandates relief to avoid an ‘extreme and
undue hardship.’”) (quoting Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986)), aff’d on other
grounds, 501 U.S. 115 (1991); Sarin v. Ochsner, 721 N.E.2d 932, 935 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)
(“More important, even if the plaintiff had no such direct interest, the defendants may not raise the
issue of standing in a rule 60(b) motion. Whether the facts of a given case meet the standard for
exercising jurisdiction—here whether the plaintiff has standing—has been termed a ‘quasijurisdictional’ determination.”).
47
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merits separate for the purpose of validity, so that the attacker of the judgment
cannot litigate the merits anew.51
In sum, there is no significant reason that a court must decide the existence
or not of personal jurisdiction before deciding the merits in the defendant’s favor.
And with personal jurisdiction off the nonbypassability list, and with finally an
understanding of the Court’s reason for creating the nonbypassability list, I
become comfortable in asserting that the Steel Co. line of cases puts only Article
III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction on the list of nonbypassable
grounds.
B. Resequencing, or Using Hypothetical Jurisdiction to Produce a “Valid”
Invalid Judgment
Ruhrgas represents another aspect of jurisdictional primacy that is
different in operation from nonbypassability. It allows resequencing of nonmerits
defenses. Ruhrgas held that the lower federal court could dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction without first deciding subject-matter jurisdiction.52
Subsequent cases have expanded the resequencing exception. Although a court
cannot bypass subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of a disposition on the merits, it
can skip over subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss on, say, forum non
conveniens.53 By being authorized to dismiss on some such nonjurisdictional
threshold defense, a court becomes freer to pursue economically an easier and

51

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e (1982) acknowledges that the
definition of jurisdiction is “particularly difficult when the issue determining subject matter
jurisdiction parallels an issue going to the merits” but the modern tendency “is to reduce the
vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.” It concludes:
In all such situations, the matter in question can plausibly be characterized either
as going to subject matter jurisdiction or as being one of merits or procedure. The line
between the categories is not established through refinement of terminology but through
the cumulation of categorizing decisions into a pattern. The establishment of pattern is
complicated by the fact that the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and merits
or procedure has significance in contexts other than that concerning the vulnerability of a
judgment to delayed attack. . . .
Whatever the context, the underlying question is how far to go in the direction
of policing the boundaries of a court's subject matter jurisdiction, when the cost of
intensive policing is to enlarge the vulnerability of the proceeding to interruption through
extraordinary writ or the like and to belated attack after it has gone to judgment.
See Morrison v. National Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010); Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d
909, 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2010); Clermont, supra note 17, at 1017-20; Howard M. Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2008).
52
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999).
53
See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (dictum).
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surer path, as long as the result is the same party prevailing as would if
jurisdiction were denied.54
To understand the effect of resequencing, though, one must back up and
consider some related doctrines. The place to begin is the doctrine of jurisdiction
to determine jurisdiction. The reason to turn to it is that this doctrine relates to res
judicata, and res judicata is where resequencing will ultimately take us. There
follows a general description as means of orientation.
1.

Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction

The doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction treats a kind of
question different from the normal application of res judicata: it does not involve
preclusive use of determinations embedded in a valid judgment, but instead
involves preclusive use of prior determinations underlying a judgment in order to
establish its validity.55 That is to say, an affirmative ruling on subject-matter
jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, or adequate notice can foreclose relitigation of
that prior determination and so preclude the parties from attacking the resultant
judgment by raising that ground in subsequent litigation.
It is true that if a defendant faces suit in a court that lacks jurisdiction or
fails to give notice, the defendant ordinarily does not have to respond in any way.
If the defendant takes no action of any kind in response to the suit, the court may
enter a default judgment, but the judgment will be invalid. If the plaintiff should
attempt to assert rights based on that judgment in a later suit involving the same
defendant, the defendant ordinarily can avoid the effects of the judgment by
showing that its entry was without jurisdiction or notice. The defendant has the
right to a day in court on the question of the authority of the court that rendered
the earlier judgment.56
However, the defendant may instead choose to raise the jurisdiction or
notice issue in the initial action before the challenged court itself. Then, a court
that otherwise lacks authority could conceivably have jurisdiction to determine
whether it has jurisdiction and whether its notice was good, and its affirmative
rulings on such questions could be binding on the defendant so as to preclude
relitigation of the same questions. The defendant’s appearance in the challenged
court would then be the defendant’s only day in court on the question of the
forum’s authority.
54

See Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV.
725, 742-46 (2009) (trying to characterize the doctrine as also serving judicial restraint).
55
See generally CLERMONT, supra note 45, §§ 4.4, 5.1(A)(3); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 95-97 (6th ed. 2002) .
56
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 65-66 (1982).

16

Our law in fact accepts this so-called bootstrap principle,57 and so allows a
court lacking fundamental authority to issue a judgment that will nevertheless be
immune from later attack. Because the issue of jurisdiction or notice was actually
litigated and determined, even if erroneously, the defendant cannot relitigate the
same issue in subsequent litigation. The defendant can obtain appellate review of
the erroneous ruling, of course, but cannot challenge it upon seeking relief from
judgment. Here the desire for finality outweighs the concern for validity.58
Indeed, our law accepts the bootstrap principle’s value of finality with true
enthusiasm, despite its conflict with the intuitive value of validity. Our law
applies the principle even more broadly than the foregoing illustration of actually
litigated and determined forum-authority defenses. Strangely, this extension
comes in connection with subject-matter jurisdiction, in spite of the traditional
lore about subject-matter jurisdiction’s fundamental importance. On the one hand,
as to unchallenged subject-matter jurisdiction in any action litigated to judgment
by contesting parties, the implicit determination of the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction has the res judicata consequences of an actually litigated
determination, insofar as foreclosing attack on the judgment goes.59 On the other
hand, sometimes the interests inherent in subject-matter jurisdiction are just too
important to ignore: even an express finding of the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction will not preclude the parties from attacking the resultant judgment on
that ground in special circumstances, such as where the court plainly lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction or where the judgment substantially infringes on the
authority of another court or agency.60
This doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction thus ends up being a
bit peculiar. It constitutes a third body of res judicata law, distinguishable from
claim and issue preclusion, or perhaps standing separate from res judicata. It is
obviously similar to issue preclusion, but it differs in several respects.61 The
57

See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491 (1967).
58
See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) (quasi in rem jurisdiction); Johnson v.
Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (jurisdiction over status); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931) (personal jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 10-12 (1982).
59
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982); supra text accompanying
note 44 (introducing the Chicot doctrine).
60
See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) (holding that a state-court proceeding
could not preclude a bankruptcy proceeding); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmts.
c, e (1982); Karen Nelson Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534 (1981).
61
See CLERMONT, supra note 45, § 5.1(A)(3), at 307 (footnotes omitted):
First, issue preclusion requires a valid prior judgment. Jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction does not require validity, but instead works to make invulnerable what could
otherwise be an invalid judgment. Second, issue preclusion applies only in a subsequent
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reason for difference is that the policies that shape the doctrine of jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction are unique, and so they produce a unique set of rules. For
related reasons tied to the notion that the doctrine most intimately defines the
judgment, federal common law covers the doctrine of jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction as it relates to a prior federal judgment.62
2.

Jurisdiction to Determine No Jurisdiction

Passing beyond the res judicata effects of affirmative rulings on forumauthority, what if the initial court decides that it lacks jurisdiction or failed to give
notice and so dismisses? That is, can a court, which is admittedly without
authority to enter a valid judgment, make any rulings that have preclusive effect?
Yes, there exists a doctrine of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction.63 Courts
and scholars have elaborated this doctrine less thoroughly than the jurisdiction-todetermine-jurisdiction doctrine, and thus its reach remains more controversial.
A court should have authority to determine its lack of authority. The
initial court’s ruling that it lacks authority should prevent a second try that
presents exactly the same issue. One argument for giving it at least this minimal
preclusive effect is that giving it no preclusive effect might raise the constitutional
problem associated with advisory opinions.64 More to the point, common sense
supports preclusion on the threshold issue, in order to prevent the plaintiff from
suing repetitively. So, for such limited purpose, the prior judgment is a valid one.

action, and so does not apply on a motion for relief from judgment, which is technically a
continuation of the initial action. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, however, does
apply to preclude a validity attack by such a motion, as well as by the other methods for
relief from judgment. Third, issue preclusion usually does not work to bind the party
prevailing on the issue. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction will preclude the successful
plaintiff if the unsuccessful defendant would be precluded on the jurisdiction or notice
issue. Fourth, issue preclusion applies only to issues actually litigated and determined.
Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction sometimes applies to issues of subject-matter
jurisdiction that were not litigated at all, and even against a defaulting party. Fifth, and
most importantly, special policies and concerns are at work with respect to the
jurisdiction and notice defenses, so the law needs to develop special rules and exceptions
for jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.
62
See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 396-98 (5th Cir. 2001).
On the governing law for ordinary res judicata, see Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
531 U.S. 497 (2001); Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72
U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2003).
63
See generally CLERMONT, supra note 45, § 4.4(B)(3).
64
See Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and
Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 212-13 (2001) (addressing the
preclusive effect of a federal court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction).
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Naturally, there should be limits to the res judicata effects.65 After all, the
court is supposed to be deciding only its jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.66
The dismissal of the initial action on a jurisdictional defense does not generate a
bar to a second action in an appropriate court.67 Indeed, the initial court’s negative
ruling on the jurisdictional issue should not have normal issue-preclusive effects
in a later action, and so should not preclude an issue on the merits of the same or
any other claim.68 For such purposes, the prior judgment is an invalid one. Many
good reasons support such limits, including the notions that limited jurisdiction
should yield limited effects69 and that the truncated procedure for deciding
jurisdiction counsels against carrying jurisdictional determinations over to affect
the merits.70
The driving idea is that because the prior court lacked jurisdiction, it
should be able to preclude little more than is absolutely necessary. Therefore, the
basic rule is that the preclusive effect of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction
reaches no further than the precise issue of jurisdiction itself.71 It will defeat
jurisdiction in any attempt to sue again in a second court where the same
jurisdictional issue arises,72 even when one court is state and the other federal.73
65

See id. at 206-22.
See Idleman, supra note 21, at 57-63.
67
See Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 (1866).
68
See Anusbigian v. Trugreen/Chemlawn, Inc., 72 F.3d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)
(“Thus, contrary to the plaintiff’s fear, expressed in his brief, that he might be foreclosed from
seeking damages in state court under the doctrines of res judicata or ‘law of the case,’ the remand
order forecloses nothing except further litigation of his claim in federal court.”); United States v.
Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) (“although Ritchie’s clients were barred (after Judge
Jarvis’s ruling) from relitigating whether their motion to quash could be heard before the IRS
brought an enforcement action, Judge Hull was not bound by any factual findings made by Judge
Jarvis for the limited purpose of considering the jurisdictional challenge”); By-Prod Corp. v.
Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Armen-Berry can sue By-Prod and Schiff
under Article 14 of the Illinois Criminal Code in an Illinois court, and that court will not be bound
by our reading of the Illinois law of punitive damages.”). But see infra note 91 and accompanying
text.
69
See Edney, supra note 64, at 206-14.
70
See id. at 220-22.
71
See Idleman, supra note 21, at 29; Edney, supra note 64, at 217-18. It is true that 18A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4436, at 154 (2d ed. 2002), sounds more expansive: “Although a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction does not bar a second action as a matter of claim preclusion, it does preclude
relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction question.” But in fact the specific
discussion and the cases cited conform to the idea that preclusion extends only to “the same issue
of jurisdiction.” Id. at 150 n.3, 168. But see id. at 158 n.16.
72
See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co. v. Méndez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2009),
abrogated on other grounds, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010); Hill v.
Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 2003); Bromwell v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d
208, 212-13 (3d Cir. 1997); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
73
See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
that “the Louisiana courts would be bound by our ruling that defendants had insufficient contacts
66
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But a finding of no jurisdiction does not produce a generally valid judgment and
so will not otherwise be binding in any other action.
Going beyond the basic, a determination of no jurisdiction probably
should not provide nonmutual preclusion.74 Nor should it work to establish, rather
than defeat, the jurisdiction of the other court.75 For example, a finding that a
federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because of the nonexistence of
some fact critical to exclusive jurisdiction should not force a state court to accept
jurisdiction. Even though this limitation on preclusion might lead to awkward
situations,76 an extension of binding effect to the unempowered federal court’s
dismissal appears unnecessary and hence improper. Additionally, against
preclusion one could argue that the burden of proof for defeating jurisdiction is
often lighter than the burden of proof for establishing jurisdiction, and issue
preclusion does not apply when the burden increases.77 This additional argument
is not determinative, however, because the rules of jurisdiction to determine no
jurisdiction can be specially tailored and need not conform to those of issue
preclusion.78
The jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine is, however, not in
all respects narrower than issue preclusion. The law’s capability to shape this
special preclusion doctrine can broaden it. For example, by virtue of jurisdiction
to determine no jurisdiction, an unreviewable remand for lack of removal
jurisdiction might preclude a subsequent federal action on the same cause,79 even
though an inability to obtain appellate review usually defeats issue preclusion.80
3.

Hypothetical Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Finally arriving at the workings of Ruhrgas, we find that most of the work
is already done. The unchallenged and undecided issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction turns out to be entitled to the insulation from attack afforded by the
with Louisiana to satisfy the federal due process clause requisites for personal jurisdiction”);
Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 1978) (“We must agree that the merits
of the issue of personal jurisdiction over Volkswagen South was decided by the unappealed state
court judgments and that they bar relitigation of the jurisdictional issue in the instant cases.”).
74
See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 4436, at 156, 171.
75
See R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 657 n.10 (2d Cir.
1979), abrogated on other grounds, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). But see Roth v.
McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963).
76
See Julie Fukes Stewart, Note, “Litigation Is Not Ping-Pong,” Except When It Is:
Resolving the Westfall Act’s Circularity Problem, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2010) (describing
cases that bounce between removal and remand).
77
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982).
78
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79
See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 4436, at 155-56, 164.
80
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982).
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jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine, if the court acts as if subjectmatter jurisdiction exists. A decided threshold defense turns out to be entitled to
the preclusive effect afforded by the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction
doctrine, if the court dismisses on that defense. Now, Ruhrgas’s resequencing
allows the court to “hypothesize” the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction
(including Article III justiciability) in order to dismiss on a threshold defense,
even though someone has challenged subject-matter jurisdiction. As long as no
other available ground for showing invalidity exists, such as lack of territorial
jurisdiction or notice,81 and as long as something has not gone haywire, such as
the prior court plainly lacking subject-matter jurisdiction or the prior judgment
substantially infringing on the authority of another court or agency,82 this
hypothetical jurisdiction will supply subject-matter jurisdiction to produce a valid
judgment for the very limited purpose of jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction.
Admittedly, not everything about Ruhrgas follows without a wisp of
oddity. By combining two purposefully restricted doctrines—the jurisdiction-todetermine-jurisdiction doctrine and the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction
doctrine—Ruhrgas expands them. Although it does not produce a generally valid
and binding judgment, it produces a judgment that will defeat a second court’s
jurisdiction if the same jurisdictional issue arises there. That is to say, a judgment
that decided that some facet of authority was lacking will have this preclusive
effect—even though subject-matter jurisdiction might have been lacking too. That
is odd. Yet that oddity was precisely the intended effect of Ruhrgas’s blessing of
hypothetical jurisdiction.
Moreover, the resulting doctrine is broader than the name “jurisdiction to
determine no jurisdiction” implies. It extends beyond jurisdiction to quasijurisdictional decisions and other dismissals for lack of authority, including on
venue and forum non conveniens grounds.83 For example, if a court faces
defenses of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and of improper venue, it can skip
over the former to give a decision that the venue was wrong, which will be
binding on that narrow point thanks to hypothetical jurisdiction. Ruhrgas thereby
yields a judgment valid for the very limited purpose of defeating jurisdiction, or
authority more generally, in any attempt to sue again in a court where the same
jurisdictional or authority issue arises.
One could counterargue that Ruhrgas’s holding does not strictly require
hypothetical jurisdiction. The idea would be that all the Ruhrgas Court did was
allow dismissal for personal jurisdiction, thus getting the case out of the federal
81

See supra text accompanying note 45 (explaining that assumed-jurisdiction preclusion
does not extend to territorial jurisdiction or notice).
82
See supra text accompanying note 60 (explaining that assumed-jurisdiction preclusion
does not extend to every exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction).
83
See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 4436, at 171-79.

21

court but not necessarily giving the personal jurisdiction decision any binding
effect.84 Yet, no one takes that position.85 The preclusion of hypothetical
jurisdiction is necessary because otherwise the judgment will mean almost
nothing: as Justice Ginsburg declared during oral argument, “The Federal court
would be accomplishing nothing [if it did not] bind the State court.”86
Additionally, there is the argument that preclusion on the threshold issue is
required practically to prevent the plaintiff from suing repetitively. Finally, the
system does not want to discourage the defendant from putting an array of
threshold defenses before the court, which can then decide the optimal course of
proceeding.
Those wary of overbroad preclusion do counterargue that preclusion at the
least should not broaden from intrasystem necessity to intersystem bindingness,
so that the plaintiff who cannot sue again in the federal court should be able to sue
without preclusion in state court.87 The rejoinder here is that the parties and the
Justices on oral argument in Ruhrgas certainly assumed that intersystem
preclusion was at stake.88 The Court clearly envisaged intersystem preclusion, just
as Justice Ginsburg suggested in her opinion for the unanimous Court:

84

Bear in mind that a valid judgment—one that can survive an attack for relief from
judgment on fundamental grounds such as lack of jurisdiction or notice—enjoys normal res
judicata effects. Thus, after determination of a forum-authority defense by a valid judgment, the
normal rules of res judicata apply. For example, if the question of a party’s domicile is actually
litigated and determined to uphold jurisdiction, and if that question of domicile arises as part of the
merits of another claim, the prior finding could have issue-preclusive effect. For a quite different
example, if a defendant loses a post-judgment attack made on the ground of inadequate notice, that
loss will preclude further attacks on that ground, under the normal doctrine of issue preclusion.
See, e.g., Arecibo Radio Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 825 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1987). Therefore, if a federal
court bypassed all threshold issues to dismiss for lack of venue, and a collateral attack on the
judgment later failed because the second court found that the first court had jurisdiction and gave
notice, the venue determination would be issue preclusive—without resort to the jurisdiction-todetermine-jurisdiction doctrine, the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, or
hypothetical jurisdiction discussed herein.
85
Even the earliest paper, which coined the term “hypothetical jurisdiction,” concluded
that the resulting judgment must have res judicata effect. See Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction
Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 730
n.110 (1979).
86
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574
(1999) (No. 98-470); see supra text accompanying note 64.
87
See Ely Todd Chayet, Comment, Hypothetical Jurisdiction and Interjurisdictional
Preclusion: A “Comity” of Errors, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 99-101 (2000) (suggesting that a federal
decision based on hypothetical jurisdiction should not preclude state courts); Edney, supra note
64, at 218, 222 (same). Their argument is that there be no preclusion in state court, not merely that
there be no preclusion if the state court were to find on collateral attack that federal subject-matter
was lacking. See id. at 215 n.116.
88
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 8-9, 13, 30-31, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574 (1999) (No. 98-470).
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If a federal court dismisses a removed case for want of personal
jurisdiction, that determination may preclude the parties from relitigating
the very same personal jurisdiction issue in state court. See Baldwin v.
Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 524-527 (1931)
(personal jurisdiction ruling has issue-preclusive effect).89
Moreover, intersystem preclusion is implicit in Ruhrgas’s holding, because
allowing the Texas state court to reconsider either federal subject-matter
jurisdiction or the federal courts’ decision on personal jurisdiction would undercut
the Court’s decision. Reconsideration of subject-matter jurisdiction would forfeit
the effort saved in skipping a tough question, and the reconsideration would come
in a state court distant from and unfamiliar with the issue’s intricacies. The state’s
reconsideration of personal jurisdiction would directly disregard the federal
court’s determination. Accordingly, under the federal res judicata law applicable
to a federal judgment, the federal judgment in Ruhrgas’s favor would preclude
later suit in a Texas state court for lack of personal jurisdiction.90
The counterarguments will not prevail. In fact, the danger is that courts
will give too much preclusive effect.91 That danger will only grow in the light of
Justice Ginsburg’s dicta:
Issue preclusion in subsequent state-court litigation, however, may
also attend a federal court’s subject-matter determination. Ruhrgas
hypothesizes, for example, a defendant who removes on diversity grounds
a state-court suit seeking $50,000 in compensatory and $1 million in
punitive damages for breach of contract. . . . If the district court
determines that state law does not allow punitive damages for breach of
contract and therefore remands the removed action for failure to satisfy the
amount in controversy, . . . the federal court’s conclusion will travel back
with the case. Assuming a fair airing of the issue in federal court, that
court’s ruling on permissible state-law damages may bind the parties in
state court, although it will set no precedent otherwise governing statecourt adjudications. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940) (“[Federal courts’] determinations of
[whether they have jurisdiction to entertain a case] may not be assailed
collaterally.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, p. 115 (1980)
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Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999).
See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 71, § 4436, at 168 & n.33; Idleman, supra note 21,
at 29; David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her
Contributions in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 30 (2004).
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See, e.g., Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1206
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an issue decided in a personal jurisdiction dismissal—“whether
Applebee’s assumed or represented that it would assume Casual Dining’s purchase agreement
with Matosantos”—was preclusive on the merits in a second suit).
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(“When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the
judgment [ordinarily] precludes the parties from litigating the question of
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation.”).92
But Justice Ginsburg had just swallowed this example whole, when offered it by
Charles Alan Wright during his oral argument for the petitioner.93 The support she
offers is completely irrelevant, as Chicot and the Restatement deal only with
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction cutting off collateral attack and not with
collateral estoppel. Not surprisingly, then, her result, even if hedged, is wrong.94
No reason exists to give decisions based on hypothetical jurisdiction more
preclusive effect than what is appropriate under jurisdiction to determine no
jurisdiction.95 Again, the many good reasons for strictly limiting res judicata
effects include the idea that limited jurisdiction should yield limited effects,
especially when the court has skipped over decision on subject-matter
jurisdiction. The truncated procedure for deciding forum-authority issues counsels
against carrying such determinations over to affect the merits. Therefore, the
preclusive effect in this context should work only to defeat any attempt to resue in
a second court where the same authority issue arises, thus not extending beyond
the precise issue of authority that the first court decided.
4.

Resequenceable Grounds

The question remains of which grounds can leapfrog ahead of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Resequencing even of the merits, although presumably
without the interplay of hypothetical jurisdiction, had become popular in the
lower courts by the 1990s.96 That movement generated the reaction that was the
Steel Co. case.97 But a certain amount of resequencing had in fact been popular
even in Supreme Court,98 as Steel Co. acknowledged.99 After Steel Co., the
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Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1999).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574
(1999) (No. 98-470).
94
See supra note 68 (collecting cases); Idleman, supra note 21, at 29-30 (arguing also that
Ginsburg’s example invokes law of the case rather than res judicata); Edney, supra note 64, at
201-02.
95
See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
96
See, e.g., United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 474 (3d Cir. 1997) (calling hypothetical
jurisdiction to reach the merits a “settled principle”).
97
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998).
98
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997) (treating class
certification as resequenceable); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-67
(1997) (mootness); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975) (abstention), discussed in Idleman, supra
note 21, at 91 & n.512; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (discretionary
supplemental jurisdiction); Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970)
(exhaustion).
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See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998).
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Supreme Court expanded the list of resequenceable grounds.100 Meanwhile, the
lower courts resumed expanding that list too, to reach many relatively low-level
inquiries.101
“There is an array of non-merits questions” that federal courts may
resequence today, as the D.C. Circuit summed it up nicely once again.102 In Tenet
v. Doe, the Supreme Court tried to generalize when it allowed resequencing of a
ground “designed not merely to defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial
inquiry.”103
Then in Sinochem, the Court more clearly drew the outer line as lying
between “nonmerits” and “merits” grounds:
Dismissal short of reaching the merits means that the court will not
“proceed at all” to an adjudication of the cause. . . . The principle
underlying these decisions was well stated by the Seventh Circuit:
“[J]urisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the
merits.”104
Thus, “when considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so
warrant,”105 a court can decide “a threshold, nonmerits issue”106 like forum non
conveniens before subject-matter jurisdiction. But then, almost as if to
demonstrate the lack of clarity of the Court’s chosen dividing line, Justice
Ginsburg qualified: “We therefore need not decide whether a court conditioning a
forum non conveniens dismissal on the waiver of jurisdictional or limitations
defenses in the foreign forum must first determine its own authority to adjudicate
the case.”107 What Sinochem ultimately means, then, is that there is still plenty of
room for arguing about the extent of the list of resequenceable grounds.
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Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (dictum)
(treating forum non conveniens as resequenceable); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129
(2004) (third-party standing); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) (Totten doctrine, which prohibits
actions against the government based on covert espionage agreements); Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (prudential standing); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 831 (1999) (class certification, viewed as a matter of statutory standing); Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (personal jurisdiction).
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See, e.g., In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2008) (transfer of venue); In re
Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (forum non conveniens).
102
Galvan v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (treating
federal sovereign immunity as resequenceable).
103
544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005) (dismissing on the basis of a rule prohibiting actions against
the government based on covert espionage agreements).
104
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting
Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006)).
105
Id. at 432.
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Id. at 433.
107
Id. at 435.
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Matters of sovereign immunity generate hot dispute in this respect.108
Does the act-of-state defense come within the fold of threshold, nonmerits
defenses?109 Is qualified immunity a resequenceable matter?110 One is tempted to
say at least that defenses like res judicata or the statute of limitations are too much
on the merits to resequence. But then one confronts the argument that even the
merits should be resequenceable if the merits and jurisdiction intertwine.111
Where is the line, if one exists at all?
One might think that no line will ever hold, that there is no logical
stopping point in the expansion of the list of resequenceable grounds since the
Steel Co. decision. But if the list were to expand into the merits, the Steel Co. rule
would promptly unravel. We would be back where we started: a court could
decide issues in any sequence, although the resulting judgment would be exposed
to the normal avenues for relief from judgment, including collateral attack on
subject-matter jurisdiction grounds. The nonbypassability rule would disappear,
and hypothetical jurisdiction would no longer operate.112
108

See Idleman, supra note 21, at 81-89 (discussing both the Eleventh Amendment and
federal sovereign immunity); cf. id. at 95-97 (discussing bypassability); Hien Ngoc Nguyen,
Comment, Under Construction: Fairness, Waiver, and Hypothetical Eleventh Amendment
Jurisdiction, 93 CAL. L. REV. 587 (2005) (same). The defense of domestic sovereign immunity is
tricky because some see it as jurisdictional, while others see it as quasi-jurisdictional, in various
contexts. But as I shall argue, the key question is whether a decision on such a ground will bar a
new action, not some other question like whether the defendant can get relief from a default
judgment on such a ground. Compare Galvan v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (treating federal sovereign immunity as resequenceable), with Calderon v.
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) (suggesting that subject matter-jurisdiction must come before
Eleventh Amendment).
Foreign sovereign immunity may be different, because more people see it in more
contexts as partly a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B.
RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 66-72 (4th ed. 2007);
cf. Kao Hwa Shipping Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (allowing
relief from default judgment on the ground of foreign sovereign immunity). Thus, it could be
nonbypassable and yet not resequenceable.
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See Rutledge, supra note 4, at 44-46 (arguing, against precedent, that the law should
change to bring this defense into the resequenceable group, because not doing so gives settlement
leverage to plaintiffs, increases judicial investment of resources, and retards development of legal
glosses on the defense).
110
See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL COURTS
540-41 (2d ed. 2009) (posing the question).
111
See Long Term Care Partners, LLC v. United States., 516 F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cir.
2008); Joshua Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader “Arising Under”
Jurisdictional Question, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (2004) (arguing that dismissal for lack of a
federal cause of action should be deemed quasi-jurisdictional and hence resequenceable).
112
See supra note 84 (explaining how validity works in the absence of hypothetical
jurisdiction). Of course, the system could alternatively take the radical step of removing subjectmatter jurisdiction as a requirement for a valid judgment. See Moore, supra note 60; Note, supra
note 48.
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In other words, if Steel Co. calls for an ever-expanding list, then Steel Co.
carries the seeds of its own destruction,113 much like the fate of other sequencing
rules.114 Therefore, a line must be drawn: as long as the Court wants to allow
federal courts to skip subject-matter jurisdiction purposefully for easier and surer
decision with binding effect on certain threshold matters, it must not extend the
permission to decisions on the merits.
True, Chicot stands for the proposition that a court without subject-matter
jurisdiction can give a binding decision on the merits, as long as the court thought
it had subject-matter jurisdiction or the parties failed to raise subject-matter
jurisdiction.115 But, as Steel Co. necessarily said, a court cannot purposefully skip
subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss on the merits. In that sense, the case’s
nonbypassability rule represents a limit on Chicot, just as it was the price for
approving hypothetical jurisdiction.116 Moreover, Steel Co. was a rejection of the
alternative route of allowing the court to dismiss on the merits but giving the
decision no preclusive effect at all.117 In effect, Steel Co., as elaborated by
Ruhrgas, was a compromise between those two views: making hypothetical
jurisdiction too widely available in support of preclusion after the judge
discretionarily sequences the defenses or prohibiting hypothetical jurisdiction
altogether.
Therein lies the key to understanding resequenceability. The compromise
allows hypothetical jurisdiction only for dismissal on nonmerits grounds, giving
that dismissal the strictly circumscribed preclusive effect prescribed for the
jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine. To get rid of the case at the
threshold in a way that precludes only the threshold issue, so allowing the plaintiff
to correct the threshold defect in a second suit, is desirable. By contrast, there is
no reason to allow exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction in a way that precludes the
merits, especially in the possible absence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover,
113

See Friedenthal, supra note 28, at 270-75; Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of
Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1614, 1631 (2003) (arguing that “there is no hard conceptual
difference between jurisdiction and the merits” and “when faced with the truly extraordinary case,
the lower federal court judge knows that he or she can rule on the merits in the absence of
jurisdiction”); Viavant, supra note 40, at 571-72; cf. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie,
61 STAN. L. REV. 971 (2009) (detailing other difficulties of the “jurisdiction” term); Jay Tidmarsh,
Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 409-13 (2010) (detailing other
difficulties of the “merits” term).
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See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (undercutting the former
sequencing rule of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (treating qualified immunity)).
115
See supra text accompanying notes 44 & 59 (explaining the Chicot doctrine).
116
See supra text accompanying notes 44-50 (explaining the rationale of the
nonbypassability list).
117
See supra text accompanying notes 84-86 (explaining the unsatisfactoriness of this
route).
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it would not be feasible to give a strictly circumscribed preclusive effect to a
decision on the merits, because if it gets any preclusive effect it will kill the cause
of action.
The rule that emerges is not a compromise made only for the sake of
compromise. It is a rule that makes good policy sense. It gives the judge a zone of
freedom of action at the threshold. Yet it tells the judge that to dispose of a claim
in a preclusive way on the merits, the judge has first to make sure that the
jurisdictional ducks are in a row. Otherwise, hypothetical subject-matter
jurisdiction will be unavailable to insulate the judgment from later attack.
With the contours of that Steel Co.-Ruhrgas compromise finally
understood, the decisional grounds for which a court may purposefully skip over a
challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction become apparent. The length of the list
should not turn on some abstract notion like “essentiality” to the judicial
process.118 Instead, the law should draw the line in practical terms, by looking to
when a court possibly lacking subject-matter jurisdiction should be able to give a
binding decision on a defense. It should not be able to act when the effect is to kill
the cause of action, but only when the plaintiff has a chance to avoid or correct
the defect. Well, the law already specifies when a plaintiff normally can start over
after a contested dismissal. Accordingly, resequenceability should look to the line
that res judicata already draws, with fair clarity, when it declines to create a bar to
reassertion of the claim after an adjudication “not on the merits.”119 Thus, the list
of resequenceable items should include only those defenses that would result in
dismissals not on the merits in the claim-preclusive sense.120
118

But see Idleman, supra note 21, at 12-13.
ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 98-99 (2001):
Certain dismissals not on the merits remain exceptions to the rule of bar,
namely: (1) dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction,
improper venue, inadequate notice, or nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties; (2) most
dismissals for prematurity of suit or failure to satisfy a precondition to suit; and (3) most
voluntary dismissals. Moreover, unless prohibited by statute or rule, the court in the first
action can specify that its dismissal is not to act as a bar; and the court in the second
action will defer to that specification.
Other dismissals and judgments, which are perhaps not in any real sense on the
merits but which were preceded by an ample opportunity for plaintiff to litigate the claim,
have of late come within the rule of bar, at least in the view of many courts and
legislatures. Examples include: (1) a dismissal for failure to state a claim; (2) a summary
judgment, judgment on partial findings, or judgment as a matter of law and other
decisions squarely on the merits; and (3) a dismissal for failure to prosecute or to obey a
court order or rule, even though it is not in any real sense on the merits.
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A dismissal for failure to prosecute or to obey a court order or rule might have
presented a special problem for this formulation, had not the Court already solved it in Willy v.
Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992) (upholding imposition of FED. R, CIV. P. 11 sanctions even in
a case dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Thus, a court can proceed directly to a
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On the one hand, the settled Steel Co.-Ruhrgas line of precedent—which
lists justiciability, jurisdiction, abstention, exhaustion, class certification, and
venue as resequenceable grounds—conforms to this test. Dismissals on such
grounds do not create a bar to a new action when the plaintiff avoids or corrects
the defect.121
On the other hand, the disputed matters of sovereign immunity, act of
state, and qualified immunity should not be resequenceable: to bypass subjectmatter jurisdiction and give a preclusive decision on such a defense kills the cause
of action on the merits, as opposed to merely deciding some threshold issue that
normally does not create a bar.122 Likewise, the intuition that the other defenses
are not resequenceable seems sound: res judicata123 and even the statute of
limitations124 are sufficiently on the merits in a claim-preclusive sense. Finally,
the jurisdiction/merits divider persists in the law of claim preclusion: a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction is not treated as being on the merits, no matter how
intertwined with the merits it might be, while a dismissal for failure to state a
claim is now treated as being on the merits.125 Although there may be very good
policy reasons to reach some of these issues early,126 there is no reason to extend
hypothetical subject-matter jurisdiction to them. An important insight is that one
should not compose the list with the policies of efficient sequencing in mind, but
instead with a focus on when we wish to extend a preclusive effect to the decided
defense even in the possible absence of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
In sum, and as suggested at the outset, the list of resequenceable threshold
matters is not the same as, and is in fact much longer than, the list of fundamental
matters that a federal court cannot bypass. With the logic behind resequencing
exposed, I am much more comfortable in specifying the two lists:

disciplinary dismissal, which then will have normal res judicata effects because subject-matter
jurisdiction for discipline exists.
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982).
122
See id. § 19.
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See Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 138-40 (3d Cir. 1947); Bronstein v.
Kalcheim, 467 N.E.2d 979 (Ill. App. 1984).
124
See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 119, at 93-96.
125
See supra note 51 (discussing the jurisdiction/merits divider in the similar, but not
necessarily identical, context of validity).
126
See, e.g., supra note 109 (discussing act of state).
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Nonbypassable Defenses
i.e., defenses the court cannot skip
over to dismiss on the merits
Article III justiciability;
subject-matter jurisdiction

5.

Resequenceable Defenses
i.e., defenses on which the court can
dismiss without first deciding
nonbypassable defenses
other justiciability and jurisdiction;
abstention; exhaustion; class
certification; venue; anything else not
on the merits in the claim-preclusive
sense

Discretion to Resequence

Once the court decides that an asserted defense is resequenceable, then the
court must decide whether to decide it first. Normally, the court will still decide
subject-matter jurisdiction first in light of Steel Co., but Ruhrgas frees the court to
decide the other defense if that path is easier or surer or if that path serves other
institutional interests.127 But that discretion is not my concern in this Part. Here I
am interested in a rule that forbids sequencing in the court’s discretion, and
incidentally how uncertainty about the scope of the rule might affect the exercise
of that discretion.
C. Summary
Today, upon a challenge to Article III justiciability or subject-matter
jurisdiction, a federal court cannot avoid the challenge by dismissing on the
merits, but the court may invoke hypothetical jurisdiction to dismiss on any
nonmerits defense with preclusive effect as to that defense. In other words, the
court should normally decide defenses of subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset
of the case. Such a fundamental matters is nonbypassable. But if the defendant
challenges the existence of some other threshold jurisdiction-like requirement, the
court has discretion to act as if it has subject-matter jurisdiction and dismiss on
the basis of that other defect. Thus, relying on hypothetical jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the court can resequence to render a binding determination on the
lack of, say, personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.
Nonbypassability has obvious sequencing implications for judicial
decisionmaking, because courts must decide in a certain order under that regime.
It is indeed the law’s foremost limitation on the courts’ power to sequence. But
upon close examination, the nonbypassability rule proves to be quite narrow, and
127
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the exception of resequenceability quite broad. Thus, this foremost sequencing
limitation turns out not to be a major constraint, except perhaps by its lack of
clarity.
To the extent that courts are uncertain of the reach of the nonbypassability
rule, but wish to avoid reversal, they will follow it even when it does not apply.
Likewise, courts might be uncertain as to the list of resequenceable grounds or as
to the workings of hypothetical jurisdiction. The result will be an unwillingness to
avoid jurisdictional questions.
Steel Co.-Ruhrgas is a good doctrine, when properly limited. To the extent
that confusion creates a broader constraint, the constraint is undesirable. The
above-given attention to the precise meaning of the doctrine worked well to
reduce the current fog. Ideally, the doctrine should prove, in future actual practice,
to be a fairly minimal constraint on courts’ sequencing power.
III. INTRASUIT PRECLUSION
A. Jury-Judge Sequencing
The middle of the last century saw a series of famous cases by which the
Supreme Court reconciled the merger of law and equity with the Seventh
Amendment, and through which the Court greatly expanded the scope of the jury
right.128 In the process, the Court created a sequencing rule under which a federal
court129 must give first to the jury a factual issue common to the merits of a law
claim and an equity claim joined in the same case. Given all those conditions, to
say nothing of the rarity of trial,130 this rule has only occasional application.
1.

Cases
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See generally RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1495-527 (10th ed. 2010); 9 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302.1 (3d ed.
2008).
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Although the Supreme Court has held most of the rights in the Bill of Rights to be
fundamental enough for the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee against invasion by the states,
the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury has not been one of those. See, e.g., Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La.), aff’d mem.
sub nom. Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973). That is to
say, the Seventh Amendment applies to actions in the federal courts, but not to state-court actions.
But cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010) (throwing the old
cases into doubt and opening the door slightly to incorporating the Seventh Amendment).
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Seventh Amendment has had little persuasive
influence on state courts. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 128, at 1510-11.
130
See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919,
1956-61 (2009) (showing that the trial rate has dropped nearly to 1% of filed federal cases).
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Beacon Theatres131 was the first of those cases. It involved a dispute
between movie theaters over the right to show movies exclusively in the
competitive area, for a time period specified in a contractual “clearance.” In
essence, Fox sued Beacon in equity for an injunction, and Beacon counterclaimed
at law for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The two claims had a common
issue concerning whether the Fox and Beacon theaters were in competition even
though more than ten miles apart. Beacon wanted a jury trial. As a historical
matter, an equity court had discretion whether to proceed in these circumstances
or to defer to the later-commenced law action on the thought that the legal remedy
was adequate.132 Accordingly, the district court chose to decide the equity claim
first, without a jury, and the court of appeals assented. The Supreme Court
reversed.
First, the Court’s all-important premise133 was that whichever
determination on the common issue came first—be it by judge or by jury—would
preclude the second determination:
Thus the effect of the action of the District Court could be, as the Court of
Appeals believed, “to limit the petitioner’s opportunity fully to try to a
jury every issue which has a bearing upon its treble damage suit,” for
determination of the issue of clearances by the judge might “operate either
by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both parties
with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim.”134
The Court in fact cited nothing for its res judicata point. But as to preclusion
between law and equity, the Court was right, as to now135 and 1791.136 Because
the old courts administered law and equity in separate suits, they applied
preclusion between them according to the ordinary rules of res judicata.
131

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
See American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937); FIELD ET AL., supra note
128, at 1493-95.
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See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 334 (1979); David L. Shapiro &
Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85
HARV. L. REV. 442, 446 (1971).
134
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issue by the court will operate either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude
both parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim.” Beacon
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Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1946), for this proposition, but nevertheless held
that the district judge could discretionarily try the equitable claim first.
135
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Second, the Court reasoned that to circumvent preclusion, the trial judge
could invoke his or her sequencing discretion. The judge should exercise such
discretion in the light of current procedural realities—“not by precedents decided
under discarded procedures, but in the light of the remedies now made
available.”137 In a merged system, the legal remedy, because it no longer required
a separate action, had become an adequate remedy. Equity could await the trial of
the common law claim. The judge could try the issue first to the jury without any
disadvantage to the parties.
Third, the Court ruled that preclusion of a jury by a prior determination in
the same suit would normally violate the Seventh Amendment.138 Therefore, the
judge now must proceed in the order of jury decision on the common issue
coming first. Note that the Court did not fashion a general principle that the jury
must go first on common issues. Instead, it ruled that a court cannot conduct a
single suit in a way that would defeat the jury right. Accordingly, its holding
applies only when intrasuit preclusion is actually in play.
The Court’s three-step reasoning is obscure for modern minds. It bears
repeating that the Court saw its task as being to preserve the jury right in an
altered procedural system. It thought that res judicata would apply in a single suit
if, and only if, the parties would have brought separate suits in 1791: in those
circumstances, an earlier jury determination would bind the judge, just as an
earlier judge determination would bind the jury. The Court manipulated history,
without disregarding it, by finding equity to have possessed discretion in the old
days and merely directing how modern chancellors should exercise it. The
Seventh Amendment, because it favored the jury trial right over the judge trial
right, requires modern courts to use their new procedural discretion in a way to
avoid that preclusion of the jury. However, the Court did hedge a bit:
If there should be cases where the availability of declaratory
judgment or joinder in one suit of legal and equitable causes would not in
all respects protect the plaintiff seeking equitable relief from irreparable
harm while affording a jury trial in the legal cause, the trial court will
necessarily have to use its discretion in deciding whether the legal or
equitable cause should be tried first. Since the right to jury trial is a
constitutional one, however, while no similar requirement protects trials
by the court, that discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever
possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial. . . . This long-standing
principle of equity dictates that only under the most imperative
137
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circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of
the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.139
These hesitancies evaporated three years later when the Court, again by
Justice Black, decided Dairy Queen.140 There the plaintiff had joined equitable
and legal claims for relief. The defendant wanted a jury trial. As a historical
matter, an equity court had no discretion as to the common issues, because the
plaintiff could have denied the defendant a jury right on them by suing initially in
equity only.141 Accordingly, the district court denied the request for a jury, and the
court of appeals assented. But again the Supreme Court reversed.
With a strong pro-jury bias, the Court simply lifted the holding of Beacon
Theatres and applied it without regard to its context. The Dairy Queen Court said
that “in a case such as this where there cannot even be a contention of such
‘imperative circumstances,’ Beacon Theatres requires that any legal issues for
which a trial by jury is timely and properly demanded be submitted to a jury.”142
It therefore closed:
We conclude therefore that the district judge erred in refusing to
grant petitioner’s demand for a trial by jury on the factual issues related to
the question of whether there has been a breach of contract. Since these
issues are common with those upon which respondents’ claim to equitable
relief is based, the legal claims involved in the action must be determined
prior to any final court determination of respondents’ equitable claims.143
With Beacon Theatres cut free of its moorings in reason, virtually no
subsequent cases have found imperative circumstances to avoid applying its
rule.144 The rule applies without regard to historical restrictions or current
circumstances. Even if the trial court dismisses the legal claim for relief joined by
the plaintiff with an equitable claim for relief and if the court then tries the
equitable claim without the jury requested by the plaintiff, the same rule applies:
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when the appellate court finds the dismissal to have been in error, the trial court
must retry the common issues to a jury first.145
2.

Consequences

As one consequence, today the strict sequencing rule is that a federal
court must, upon request for a jury, first try to the jury any issue common to
joined legal and equitable claims for relief.146 The joinder could be by the
plaintiff joining multiple claims for relief, or by the defendant asserting a defense
or counterclaim that could in the old days have stood as a separate claim. As
another consequence, the jury’s decision will bind the judge on the common
issue.147
Where does this preclusion rule come from? It does not come from res
judicata, which applies only between separate suits,148 as all the hornbooks say.149
It rests solely on the Seventh Amendment’s historical approach:150 because in
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1791 the legal and equitable claims would have been separate suits, we should
apply intrasuit preclusion between jury and judge in order to preserve the jury
right as it was. Therefore, being an aspect of jury right, and not part of res
judicata, this special kind of jury-judge preclusion has no broader application than
factual issues common to joined legal and equitable claims.
Where does that sequencing rule come from? It follows from the premise
of the Seventh Amendment’s special preclusion law. Therefore, it too has no
broader application than factual issues common to joined legal and equitable
claims.
Of course, one could say that the jury precedents will come to apply
without any regard to their reasoning, much as Dairy Queen extended Beacon
Theatres. But that outcome is unlikely now that the jury mania of the 1960s has
passed.151 Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen was a product of its time, and now the
Court would probably not adopt it as a matter of first impression. We accordingly
need to excavate the Court’s train of reasoning, and respect its inherent restraining
force.
This restrained view of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen helps to explain the
later Parklane Hosiery.152 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a prior
equitable decree could preclude the defendant in a subsequent law action brought
by a new plaintiff. On the one hand, this result is consistent with the law of res
judicata, which allows equity-law preclusion.153 It is indeed consistent with the
views that res judicata adjusts to any procedural changes and that expanding res
judicata can apply in new situations despite old procedural limitations. Just as
merged procedure caused claim preclusion to extend to plaintiffs who sue on
either the legal or the equitable part of a claim without the other part,154
nonmutual collateral estoppel could leap the equity/law divide to defeat a jury
right vis-à-vis a new plaintiff. On the other hand, the result is also consistent with
the jury-judge sequencing rule. Because that rule rests on the Seventh
Amendment’s dictate in a single suit that the judge use existing sequencing power
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to preserve the jury right, it has no application to the Parklane situation of
separate lawsuits for which sequencing is not a possibility.155 The Supreme Court
could have invented a wholly new rule of res judicata that provided for no
preclusion at the expense of the jury right in any setting whatsoever, but the projury motivation to invent had waned.
Nevertheless, this view of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen is not only
restrained but also subtle. Lower courts can misunderstand it and, at least within a
single suit, think that the jury-judge sequencing rule applies more broadly than it
should.
The prime example of confusion involves issues common to jurisdiction
and the merits. Although there is no constitutional jury right on jurisdictional
issues,156 courts and commentators equivocate on whether a jury must first
determine any common issue.157 They are wrong to equivocate. Beacon TheatresDairy Queen applies only to issues common to joined legal and equitable claims,
not to issues common to jurisdiction and the merits. The reason is that the
preclusion premise of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen rested on preclusion
between separate law and equity suits. Preclusion never extended to decisions on
jurisdiction precluding later consideration of the merits in the same suit.158
Because there would be no preclusion, there is no need to invert matters by a
sequencing that would have the merits considered by a jury before the judge could
decide the common issue involved in the dispute over jurisdiction. Therefore, the
judge can decide jurisdiction at the outset, and the jury can decide anew the
common issue at the regular trial.
B. Foreclosure
Concern about preclusion in violation of the Seventh Amendment
generated Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen. But as shown above, its sequencing rule
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does not extend beyond the narrow context of factual issues common to joined
legal and equitable claims. The question now becomes whether other concerns
about foreclosure later in the same suit have generated sequencing rules
applicable in other contexts.
1.

Res Judicata

Here the answer is fairly simple. No further sequencing rules arise from
concerns about actual preclusion in the same suit. The reason is that there is no
intrasuit res judicata (as opposed to some separate doctrine such as Beacon
Theatres-Dairy Queen).159
The cases conform to that view. Besides jurisdiction, judges must decide
other preliminary matters that overlap matters destined later to go before the
ultimate decisionmaker. For example, some evidential rulings involve issues
common with the merits:
Consider the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule as it operates in
a criminal conspiracy case. To establish that a hearsay exception applies
the proponent of evidence must, by a preponderance of the evidence, show
that the prerequisites for the exception have been established. . . . But if
the substantive charge is conspiracy, that means that the court must in
effect find that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy (by a preponderance
of the evidence) before admitting this evidence which the jury must
evaluate, along with all the other evidence, in determining whether
defendant has been proved guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable
doubt. The judge does not, of course, tell the jury that she has already
concluded that defendant is guilty, albeit only by a preponderance of the
evidence, and defendant's right to a jury trial is preserved.160
Therefore, no corrective sequencing rule for evidential rulings is necessary.
More exotic rulings include Pavey v. Conley,161 where the Seventh Circuit
faced a situation in which the same factual issue, the severity of injury, was
germane both to the preliminary inquiry of whether the prisoner had exhausted his
administrative remedies and also to the merits of the case. The district court had
held that the prisoner possessed a jury trial right on any factual issues relating to
whether he had exhausted the administrative remedies, and so delayed
determination of the defense until trial. The court of appeals ruled that the judge
159
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should rule on exhaustion and do so at the outset, but that the ultimate factfinder
could revisit the judge’s determination: “if there is a jury trial, the jury will make
all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even informed of) any of
the findings made by the district judge in determining that the prisoner had
exhausted his administrative remedies.”162
The most common setting in which courts overtly discuss this problem is
class certification. By now it should be clear how the Hydrogen Peroxide case
could say: “Although the district court’s findings for the purpose of class
certification are conclusive on that topic, they do not bind the fact-finder on the
merits.”163 All the cases on point seem to say the same.164
Against all the case law, one could argue that because class actions were
equitable in origin, and that only equity could entertain a class action even when
its merits were all legal,165 we have fallen back into the context of issues common
to joined legal and equitable claims.166 But the class-action situation is different
from joinder of legal and equitable claims. Although class actions were originally
all equitable, the Supreme Court has ruled that the jury right will be determined
separately for certification and for the merits: the former remains equitable, with
decision by the judge, while the latter might be “legal,” with a jury right.167 The
certification and the merits nonetheless have always been part of one case, not to
be pursued in separate law and equity suits, and hence with no room for the
application of res judicata between the class action’s equitable and legal parts.
With the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen premise of preclusion therefore not
kicking in, there is no sequencing conclusion. The court can decide the
certification issues first, and the ultimate factfinder, be it judge or jury, will be
free to reconsider any common issues.
Alternatively, opponents of the case law on class certification could argue
that the denial of preclusion is inefficient or even unfair. The idea is that the court
should not have to try the same question twice, and the victorious party should not
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have to undergo that expense and risk. Moreover, retrying an issue creates the risk
of inconsistent determinations, which can be thorny when emanating from the
same suit. The difficulty this argument runs into, aside from any potential Seventh
Amendment concerns, is once again that there simply is no doctrine of intrasuit
res judicata to do the work. If one wants to pursue such policies relating to
efficiency and fairness, the most promising route168 involves resort to the already
applicable doctrine called law of the case.
2.

Law of the Case

A doctrine that bears some resemblance both to res judicata and to stare
decisis is law of the case.169 Despite its name, it now can apply to rulings on fact
as well as on law. It is similar to stare decisis170 in that it applies rather flexibly,
so that a court may revisit the ruling if convinced there is good reason to do so. It
is similar to res judicata in that it applies narrowly, albeit in a different range. It
does not apply beyond the parties to the case in which the ruling was rendered.171
Indeed, the ruling can be binding as the law of the case only during the later
conduct of the very case in which the ruling was made, that is, within the context
of the initial action.172 It will not bind the parties, or anyone else, in later
proceedings that are not part of the same case.
Basically, the law-of-the-case doctrine means that a question once actually
resolved in the course of litigation will not lightly be reconsidered at later stages
in the same action, except by a higher court, even if the point was erroneously
decided:
Within a single lawsuit the general principles mentioned [in
connection with stare decisis and res judicata]—desire for consistency,
desire to terminate litigation, desire to maintain the prestige of courts—
have some meaning. There is a feeling that the various phases of a lawsuit
should be consistent one with another; that the same matter should not be
the subject of repetitious, time-consuming hearings; that public confidence
must be preserved in the judicial system by adhering to a decision once
168
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made. These attitudes have been reflected in numerous cases which have
involved the “law of the case” doctrine.173
This does not mean, of course, that the parties may not directly challenge rulings
by regular procedures, such as by appeal or by motion for rehearing en banc. But
if the ruling has withstood such direct challenges, as for instance when a case has
been appealed and remanded, or if the direct challenge that might have been made
was not, the ruling is said to have become the law of that particular case and is
ordinarily not subject to reexamination.
There are many exceptions to the application of the rule of law of the case.
One may well question whether the interests of judicial economy served by the
doctrine are generally of such importance as to justify holding parties to erroneous
rulings that could still be corrected within the framework of the same case. In
view of the lesser justification of the law-of-the-case doctrine, it is not surprising
that courts have not applied it with as much rigor and consistency as they have
shown in connection with res judicata. The “ ‘law of the case,’ as applied to the
effect of previous orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the
same case, merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen
what has been decided, not a limit to their power.”174
In summary, then, law of the case, intended to foster judicial economy,
provides that a court, and any coordinate or lower courts as well, will normally
adhere to a ruling it has declared in a particular action when a party later raises the
point again in the same action. But it applies very flexibly, so that the rendering
court and coordinate courts can revisit the ruling if convinced it was wrong or
some other reason counsels reconsideration. If so interpreted as mere maxims that
a court will not lightly redo what has been done and that lower courts must obey
higher courts, then law of the case expresses only the common sense of
“protecting against the agitation of settled issues”175 or “disciplined selfconsistency,”176 and does some good and little harm.
As to the good it accomplishes, it says that any issue’s first determination
will normally stand, obviating the need for reconsideration. This normal
application will work to retrieve the efficiency and fairness that reconsideration
otherwise would put at risk.
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Its constraint is never really confining. Accordingly, it will not always
apply. In fact, the Seventh Amendment as interpreted in Beacon Theatres-Dairy
Queen dictates allowing the jury to reconsider any issue on which a constitutional
jury trial right exists.177 More generally, the court retains the power to reconsider.
Because of this flexibility, it necessitates no sequencing rules. But, because its
flexibility allows for reconsideration sometimes, it creates the risk of inconsistent
decisions. That is the harm it imposes.
When the later determination contradicts the earlier, what to do?178 Except
where the adjudicator has newly found jurisdiction to be lacking,179 the judge
need not go back and correct the earlier decision, unless the judge thinks that
undoing the earlier decision is desirable. But clearly it would be best to minimize
the occasion for inconsistency, as by regularly relying on the law-of-the-case
doctrine. An alternative would be to rationalize away the inconsistency by
construing the “common” issues to be different after all or to be governed by
different standards or burdens of proof.180
C. Summary
Upon trial of a factual issue common to the merits of both law and equity
claims for relief joined in the same case, a federal court must give the issue first to
the jury for decision. The verdict will bind the judge with respect to the equitable
claim. These two consequences derive from the Seventh Amendment.
This sequencing rule thus has a very limited range of application.
Although it applies if a case for, say, injunction and damages happens to reach
trial, it does not reach the situation of a judge deciding a threshold issue like
jurisdiction, class certification, or evidential admissibility. The reason is that in
these latter situations, there will be no intrasuit preclusion and hence no
requirement to go first to the jury.
Once again, however, the courts suffer uncertainty about the reach of this
sequencing rule. Accordingly, they defer overly to fears of intruding on the jury
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right. Efforts herein to dissipate the fog should pay dividends in establishing the
narrow limits of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen on courts’ sequencing power:
Law of the Case

Sequencing and Preclusion
in case of joinder of legal and
equitable claims for relief, the
common factual issues go first to the
jury and then the verdict binds the
judge, both rules being by virtue of
the Seventh Amendment

for all other intrasuit common issues,
there is no sequencing rule, but then
there is neither foreclosure of the jury
nor any other foreclosure beyond the
flexible law-of-the-case doctrine

CONCLUSION
Courts in federal civil cases can sequence their decision of multiple issues
as they wish, except for the narrow Steel Co.-Ruhrgas and Beacon Theatres-Dairy
Queen rules. The former rule generally requires a federal court to decide Article
III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction before ruling on the merits. The
latter rule requires a federal trial judge to give first to the jury a factual issue
common to the merits of a law claim for relief and an equity claim for relief
joined in the same case.
In conjunction with sequencing, some special preclusion will result. On
the one hand, Article III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction will most
often enjoy preclusive effect, under the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction
doctrine for affirmative decisions or the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction
doctrine for negative decisions, or by virtue of hypothetical jurisdiction for
purposefully skipped decisions. On the other hand, upon repetitive encounter of
overlapping matters in the same lawsuit, the decisionmaker can reconsider its
decision without any intrasuit preclusion, except for the jury’s Seventh
Amendment preclusion of the judge and except for the flexible restraint of the
law-of-the-case doctrine.

